Low-carbon technology innovation of power grid is vital for grid enterprises to improve their competitiveness and resource utilization efficiency. In this paper, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to examine the behavioral strategies of government, banks, and the grid enterprises in the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation. The evolutionary replication dynamics equations are presented to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of participants. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: from the subsidy perspective, even if the government subsidies are phasing out, the ESS of the low-carbon grid technology cooperation still converges to the Pareto optimal equilibrium; from the cost perspective, the higher low-carbon technology innovation cost only slows down the evolution rate, while the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost not only slow down the evolution rate but also change the evolution results. It shows that the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolution of the system than the incentive cost; from the benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state, and the effect of the former is greater than the latter. These results provide a theoretical guidance for government to promote the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Facing the challenges of global climate safety and domestic environmental pressure, China has established seven emission trading markets since 2011, including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Hebei and Chongqing [1] . In the marked-based emission trading scheme (ETS), the financial intermediaries, such as banks and funds are indispensable to promote cost-effective emission mitigation [2] . In 2014, the first pledge loan based on Chinese certified emission reduction (CCER) was presented by Shanghai Pudong Development Bank for Shanghai Zhi-xin Carbon
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Asset Management CO., LTD, which belongs to the state grid corporation of China. In fact, the electric power industry as the main forces of carbon emission reduction, can engage in such businesses as power alternatives and electric vehicle charging infrastructure construction to create a lot of carbon assets [3] . The urgent requirements on low-carbon power grid technology are put forward, since the power grids are the connection facilities between power suppliers and power consumers [4] , [5] . However, due to the low return and high uncertainty at the earlier stage of low-carbon power grid technology projects [6] , it needs the government to participate into the low-carbon power grid technology innovation to promote incentives and supervision measures to rich the electric power industry. VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ With the energy and environment issues becoming more severe, the researchers have paid more attention to low-carbon technologies in the electric power industry [7] . The renewable energy technologies have been widely applied to electric power industry, mainly including wind power technology [8] , hydroelectric technology [9] and marine tidal technology [10] . Recently, the low-carbon power grid technologies are considered as an important part of low-carbon development in the electric power industry [11] , [12] . Compared with traditional power grid, the low-carbon power grids will penetrate new types of technologies into power suppliers and consumers to promote the carbon reduction in power system [13] . Super smart grid integrates both smart grid and super grid for energy consumption and renewable energy utilization [14] . Renewable energy mini-grid makes a sustainable combination between the grid and biomass gasifiers or micro-hydro plants to realize its potential economic growth fueled by low carbon electricity [15] . As the representations of low-carbon power grid technologies, the above two have received most attention from electric power sector.
However, the above literature focuses on how to design or develop the low-carbon power grid technology. They have a basic assumption that the electric power industry has abundant funds to support technology innovation. Furthermore, they neglect the heterogeneous characteristics in cooperation. In fact, low-carbon power grid technology innovation involves many heterogeneous entities, whose different goals may lead to the failure of cooperation.
In recent years, the evolutionary game theory is widely applied to examine the multi-entities' behavior of technology innovation. Most literature focuses on the game models between two participants. First, the relation between the enterprises and other R&D organizations is studied. Pan and Long [16] employed the evolutionary game theory to analyze the cooperation between micro-grid and conventional grid and gave the players' optimal strategies. Ding et al. [17] presented the game analysis of grid resources allocation in the incomplete information. Second, some scholars studied the influence of government on enterprises' decision-making of low carbon technology innovation. Wu et al. [18] built an evolutionary model of low-carbon strategies between the government and enterprises. They suggested that the enterprises' expectation to government incentives determined whether the low-carbon strategies could be diffused. Yin et al. [19] analyzed the evolution of regional low-carbon technology innovation systems, confirming the impact of government on regional low-carbon innovation systems. Third, since the financial supports are very important for technology innovation, there are some game models between the financial institutions and enterprises [20] . Zhao and Xie [21] studied the relation between the enterprises and social risk-sharing organizations and sought equilibrium strategies. Xiao et al. [22] proposed the financial institutions collaborative innovation evolutionary game to support green finance development.
Although the literature about technology innovation has brought about rich results, but they can not solve the problem of the low-carbon power grid technology innovation involving tripartite or more entities' game behavior. In reality, the low-carbon technology innovation in the electric power industry needs many heterogeneous entities participation [23] . For example, Shanghai Zhi-xin Carbon Asset Management CO., LTD was founded in 2013 to specialize in carbon asset management operation [24] . The electric power enterprises get the pledge loan from the banks with the help of such carbon asset management companies, who verify and monitor the low-carbon power grids technology [25] . Also, the government provides the subsidy for the electric power enterprises to motivate the low-carbon power grids technology [26] , [27] . Although some research confirms the government's role, there is no analysis about low-carbon power grid technology cooperation behavior among many heterogeneous entities under government interventions.
The aim of this paper is to establish an evolutionary game model for the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation problem among the heterogeneous entities. The main contributions of this paper are presented as follows. First, this paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the grid enterprises, banks and government. The novel model can explain how these three entities choose their equilibrium strategies in the face of phasing out subsidies on the electricity market. Second, we introduce three kinds of costs into the game model according to the characteristics of heterogeneous entities. These costs include the grid enterprises' low-carbon technology innovation cost, the banks' business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the government's incentive cost. Finally, we present simulation to compare the results of the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) to provide reference for the grid enterprises, banks and government in the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation, the basic assumptions, parameters and variables. Section 3 constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model among the grid enterprises, banks and government. Section 4 simulates the models and presents the corresponding results analysis. The research conclusions and recommendations are given in Section 5.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND ASSUMPTIONS A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this paper, the financing of low-carbon grid technology innovation involves three heterogeneous entities, i.e., grid enterprises, banks and government. First, the grid enterprises can get pledge loans from the banks to support their low-carbon power grid technology innovation. Because the grid enterprises need use carbon assets as collateral based on the emission trading markets, they are required to submit carbon asset pledge registrations to the government. This will facilitate the government to transfer disposal rights and ownership of the carbon assets to the banks when the enterprises default. Next, the banks issue loans to the enterprises after checking the carbon assets pledge materials [25] . Here, the government, as a regulator, can guide the grid enterprises to innovate the low-carbon technology by implementing incentive policies, e.g., subsidy. It is shown in Figure 1 that the relationship among government, the grid enterprises and banks in the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation as follows.
B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
For the evolutionary game model of the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation, the following basic assumptions are given.
Assumptions 1: It is assumed that there are three rational players, i.e., the grid enterprises, the banks and the government. Each strategy is mutually exclusive. Each entity in the tripartite evolutionary game model is bounded rationality and hopes to maximize its own utility.
Assumptions 2: For the grid enterprises, suppose that the probability of the grid enterprises choosing low-carbon technology innovation is x ∈ [0, 1]; then the probability of choosing high-carbon technology innovation is 1 − x. The strategic choice of grid enterprises affects their own revenues and costs. We discuss the following two strategic choices of grid enterprises.
Case 1: When the enterprises adopt high-carbon technology innovation of power grid, they only get the basic project revenues E 0 . They don't need extra technology innovation cost and financial cost. Also, they can't get any low-carbon subsidies from government. Case 2: When the enterprises adopt low-carbon technology innovation of power grid, they receive green revenues E 1 and indirect benefits I 0 [28] , except for the basic project revenue E 0 . Here, indirect benefits include gains-or-loss valuation of reputation, development potential, etc. If the government has the incentive policy, the enterprises also can get the low-carbon subsidies S. Since the enterprises have to innovate, they need to pay low-carbon technology innovation cost C 0 with the carbon asset pledge credit from banks. If there are no pledge credit from banks, the enterprises have to pay extra technology innovation financial cost C 1 . Here, C 1 ( C 0 < C 1 ) includes the extra financial cost [29] .
Assumptions 3: For the banks, suppose that the probability of the banks providing the non-pledge loan is y ∈ [0, 1]; then the probability of providing the carbon asset pledge loan is 1 − y. There are two strategic choices of banks as follows.
Case 1: If there is the non-pledge credit, the banks haven't any payoff from such credit business.
Case 2: If there is the carbon asset pledge credit with the cost C 2 , the banks can get the revenue of carbon asset pledge credit E 3 and the social benefits R 1 . Since the carbon asset pledge credit is presented for the low-carbon technology innovation of the grid enterprises, the banks also have the potential benefits E 2 . Here, the potential benefits include the new business development, institutional reform and so on. But the potential benefits are affected by the successful probability δ ∈ [0, 1] of the low-carbon technology innovation [30] .
Assumptions 4: For the government, suppose that the probability of the government choosing incentive policies is z ∈ [0, 1]; the probability of non-incentive policies is 1 − z. The following two strategic choices of government are presented.
Case 1: When the government adopts the incentive strategy, it has to pay the incentive cost C 3 . If the government services the enterprises with low-carbon technology innovation, it can obtain the positive social benefits R 2 . If the government services the enterprises with high-carbon technology innovation, it can obtain negative social benefits −R 2 , such as environmental degradation [6] . Besides, it also needs to pay the cost of pollution harness C 4 for the high-carbon behavior of the grid enterprises.
Case 2: When the government adopts the non-incentive strategy, it doesn't pay the incentive cost C 3 . The government's payoffs are similar to those in the case of incentive strategy.
Assumptions 5: Suppose that there exists a positive correlation between C 0 and x. The reason is that the higher level of low-carbon technology innovation, the higher investment costs and the risks [7] . There is a positive correlation between δ and x. In reality, the more motivationally the enterprises adopt low-carbon technology innovation, the more likely they are to success. And, there is a positive correlation between C 1 and y. When the enterprises can't get pledge loans from banks, they have to pay more financial cost of technology innovation [29] . Different from the current literature, we set the variables of C 0 , δ and C 1 to be functional forms. Based on the above relations, we set C 0 (x) = x α C 0 , δ(x) = x α δ and C 1 (y) = y α C 1 .
While α = 1, the function reflects that there is a linear correlation between the probability of strategic choice and the variable; while 0 < α < 1, the concave function reflects that there is a nonlinear correlation between the probability of strategic choice and the variable; while α > 1, the convex function also reflects that there is a nonlinear correlation VOLUME 8, 2020 between the probability of strategic choice and the variable. It's specifically shown in Figure 2 .
The parameter symbols and their meanings are shown in Table 1 .
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL FOR LOW-CARBON POWER GRID TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION A. FORMULATION OF THE EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Based on the above assumptions, the payoff matrix of three parties under different strategies is shown in Table 2 . The full range of interactive, strategic combinations is expressed below. where
U 11 and U 12 are the fitness payoffs of the grid enterprises who choose low-or high-carbon technology innovation of power grid respectively. Based on Table 2 , the payoffs of the enterprises with the two different behavior strategies are as follows:
The average earning of the grid enterprises is denoted by U 1 showed as follows:
U 21 and U 22 are the fitness payoffs of the banks who provide carbon asset pledge credit or not respectively. The payoffs of the banks with the two different behavior strategies are as follows:
The average earning of the banks is denoted byŪ 2 showed as follows:
U 31 and U 32 are the fitness payoffs of the government who chooses incentive policies or not, respectively. The payoffs of the government with the two different behavior strategies are as follows:
The average earning of the government is denoted byŪ 3 showed as follows:
According to Friedman [31] , the replicator dynamic system is dynamic differential equations that describe the frequency of especial strategies used in the population [32] .
Therefore, the replicator dynamic equations of the lowcarbon technology innovation strategy selected by the grid enterprises (L(x)) and the carbon asset pledge strategy selected by the banks (M (y)), the incentive strategy selected by the government (N (z)) are as follows:
According to the stability theorem and the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the replication dynamics equation, when L(x 0 ) = 0, L (x 0 ) < 0, x 0 is ESS [33] . It is solved respectively as follows that the ESS of replication dynamics equations in the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation carried out by the enterprises, the banks and the government:
The second derivative of (18) is
In (18) , let L(x) = 0, then the solution of the dynamic replication equation is
Then the evolutionary stable strategies of low-carbon technology innovation behavior are obtained as follows:
If z = A0, then L(x) ≡ 0, the probabilities of two strategies chosen by the grid enterprises will keep invariant over time. Axis x is in a stable strategy, as shown in (a) in Figure 3 .
If z = A 0 , there are two solutions: Figure 3 . While
we can see x = 1 is the only ESS, as shown in (b) in Fig. 3 ;
we can see x = 0 is the only ESS, as shown in (c) in Figure 3 .
Based on the above analysis, the three-dimensional coordinate graphs of the relationships among the game parties and the evolution path are shown in Figure 3 .
Similarly, the second derivative of (19) is M (y) = dM (y) dy = (1 − 2y) * D 1 .
In (19) , let M (y) = 0, then the solution of the dynamic replication equation is y = 0, y = 1,
The evolutionary stability strategies of behavior of providing non-pledge credit are obtained as follows:
If x = A 1 , then M (y) ≡ 0, the probabilities of two strategies chosen by the banks will keep invariant over time. Axis y is in a stable strategy, as shown in (a) in Figure 4 . If x = A 1 , there are two solutions: y = 0, y = 1. While x(x α δE 2 + E 3 + R 1 ) > C 2 , then M (y) y=0 < 0, M (y) y=1 > 0, we can see y = 0 is the only ESS, as shown in (b) in Figure 4 .
While x(x α δE 2 + E 3 + R 1 ) < C 2 , then M (y) y=1 < 0, M (y) y = 1 > 0, we can see y = 1 is the only ESS, as shown in (c) in Figure 4 .
Based on the above analysis, the three-dimensional coordinate graphs of the relationships among the game parties and the evolution path are shown in Figure 4 .
In the same way, the second derivative of (20) is:
In (20) , let N (z) = 0, then the solution of the dynamic replication equation is
The evolutionary stability strategies of incentive behavior are obtained as follows:
If x = A 2 , then N (z) ≡ 0, the probabilities of two strategies chosen by the government will keep invariant over time. Axis z is in a stable strategy, as shown in (a) in Figure 5 . If x = A 2 , there are two solutions:
we can see z = 0 is the only ESS, as shown in (b) in Figure 5 .
While R 2 − C 3 > 0, 0 < A 2 < 1, for the two cases of the dynamic replication equation. Case (1): 0 < x < A 2 , then N (z) z=0 > 0, N (z) z=1 < 0, we can see z = 1 is the only ESS, as shown in (c) in Figure 5 ; case (2): A 2 < x < 1, then N (z) z=0 < 0, N (z) z=1 > 0, we can see z = 0 is the only ESS, as shown in (b) in Figure 5 .
Based on the above analysis results, the three-dimensional coordinate graphs of the relationship among the game parties and the evolution path is as shown in Figure 5 .
In conclusion, which strategy one population will choose is depend on the strategy chosen by the others. The ESS is the result of trial individual game.
C. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
The replicator dynamic system (I) is treated as the combining of (18), (19) and (20) . Let the replicator dynamic system (I) be Eq. (18) = 0, Eq. (19) = 0 and Eq. (20) = 0, we can get the equilibrium points (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,1,0), (1,1,1) and (x * ,y * ,z * ). Then (x * ,y * ,z * ) generally refers to all mixed strategies of the system (I).
From the deduce experience, we know that when being a mixed strategy, the equilibrium point will lead at least one eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix to be zero. This signifies that the mixed strategies are saddle points and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) can only appear in the pure strategies. Therefore, the following analysis does not consider the mixed strategies. Next, the Jacobian matrix J 1 of the above replicator dynamic system (I) is given as follows:
π 11 π 12 π 13 π 21 π 22 π 23 π 31 π 32 π 33  
where
When the equilibrium point of the replicator dynamic system (I) satisfies the condition that the all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J 1 are negative, it is an ESS. Based on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J 1 , Table 3 provides the local stability analysis for the equilibrium points of the game among the grid enterprises, the banks and the government under the scenario of α = 0. The same analyses under the scenario of α = 0 are shown in Table 4 . Under the scenario of α = 0, there are four evolutionary stability strategies (ESS) for the replication dynamic system (I), i.e., while E 1 + I 0 − C 1 > 0 and 
Under the scenario of α = 0, the replication dynamic system (I) have two evolutionary stability strategies, that is, while
It can be seen that by treating the three key parameters as decision variables, namely the low-carbon technology innovation cost C 0 , the extra technology innovation financial cost C 1 and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation δ, we exclude the two non-Pareto optimal states in the replication dynamic system. That is to say, there are optimal values of C 0 , C 1 and δ that enable the replication dynamic system to spontaneously evolve to the ideal stable state (1,0,0), when the following parameters setting conditions are met: the sum of banks' potential benefits, business revenues and social benefits brought by the carbon assets pledge credit is greater than the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit. In this case, even if the government is absent, the grid enterprises are willing to choose the strategy of adopting low-carbon technology innovation, and the banks are willing to choose the strategy of providing the carbon assets pledge credit, then the market achieves Pareto optimal state.
In order to more intuitively reflect the specific impact of endogenous parameters (α = 0) on the ESS, in the next section, we respectively analyze the sensitivity of key parameters under the hypotheses of linear correlation (α = 1) and nonlinear correlation α = 0.2 or α = 5) through simulation.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Based on the parameters setting conditions under the scenario of α = 0, we use MATLAB software to simulate the dynamic strategy evolution processes over time of the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation among the grid enterprises, the banks and the government. The time step is set to 0.03 and the initial parameters for the simulation analysis are set in Table 5 .
In order to encourage the low-carbon technological innovation, the government, the banks and the grid enterprises would interact with each other. For example, the above mentioned the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank provided the loan with the pledge of CCER to the grid enterprise of the state grid corporation of China. Here, the grid enterprises' low-carbon technology innovation cost, the banks' business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the government's incentive cost would influence their choices.
Hence, it is necessary to analyze the impacts of key parameters on the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation under the situation of power market reform. First, we show the sensitivity analysis of government subsidies S to reflect the feasibility of the carbon asset pledge financing model under the phasing out subsidies for electricity industry in Fig. 6 , and then further show the sensitivity analyses of parameters C 0 , C 2 , C 3 , δ and E 1 with the lower subsidy (S = 3) under the scenarios of α = 0.2, 1 and 5 in Figs. 7-11. Figure 6 reflects the impact of low-carbon subsidies S on the dynamic evolution process. As shown in Fig. 6(a), (b) and (c), No matter how S changes, the strategy combination always evolves from the initial one (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) to the final one (1, 0, 0). Thus, low-carbon subsidies have no effect on the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). That is, the grid enterprises finally choose the strategy of low-carbon technology innovation, the banks finally provide carbon assets pledge credit, and the government finally chooses incentive strategy. Even if S = 0, the system still converges to the ideal stable state (1,0,0). This means that the introduction of carbon market can still effectively improve the enthusiasm of grid enterprises and banks for the low-carbon gird technology cooperation, even with the reduction of low-carbon subsidies.
A. EXAMPLE 1: LOW-CARBON SUBSIDIES ON THE SYSTEM EVOLUTION
Comparing Figs. 6(a), (b) and (c), it can be seen that the larger α, the tighter the clusters of curves in the figure. This mirrors that α has a positive impact on the evolution rate. how C 0 changes, the probability of the government choosing incentive strategy is always zero (i.e., z = 0). So we temporarily ignore the discussion about the impact of C 0 on the decision-making of government. What's more, the black curve (i.e., C 0 = 0) reaches the stable state firstly, and the blue curve (i.e., C 0 = 9) is the last one. This reflects that there is a negative correlation between C 0 and the evolution rate. That is, the low-carbon technology innovation cost of grid enterprises is lower, the system converges to the ideal stable state (1,0,0) at a faster rate.
By comparing Figs. 7(a), (b) and (c), it can be seen that as α value increases, the three sets of curve clusters become more and more tight. This indicates that the greater α is, the system evolves to an ESS at a faster rate, and the evolution process is more stable. Figure 8 reflects the effect of business cost of carbon asset pledge credit C 2 on the dynamic evolution process. Whatever the value of C 2 , the government will eventually choose nonincentive policy. Therefore, we only analyze the impact of C 2 on the strategic interaction between the grid enterprises and the banks. We can see that there exists a threshold C * 2 (3 < C * 2 < 6). When C2 < C * 2 , the ESS evolves into the ideal stable state (1,0,0), and the lower C 2 is, the system evolves to the ideal stable state at a faster rate, as indicated by black curves (C 2 = 0) and red curves (C 2 = 3). When C2 > C * 2 , the strategy chosen by the banks begins to change, shifting from a preference for providing carbon asset pledge credit to a preference for not doing it, as indicated by green curves (C 2 = 6) and blue curves (C 2 = 9). That is, the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit plays a negative role to the evolution of the system to the ideal stable state via affecting bank conduct.
C. EXAMPLE 3: BUSINESS COST OF CARBON ASSET PLEDGE CREDIT ON THE SYSTEM EVOLUTION
In Figs. 8 (a) , (b) and (c), we can see that the larger α is, the tighter the three sets of curve clusters become, the system evolves to an ESS at a faster rate. Figure 9 shows the effect of incentive cost C 3 on the dynamic evolution process. Whatever the value of C 3 , the banks will eventually choose to provide carbon asset pledge credit. Therefore, we only analyze the impact of C 3 on the strategic interaction between the grid enterprises and the government. It is observed that there also exists a threshold C * 3 (0 < C * 3 < 3). When C 3 < C * 3 , the government has a preference for incentive policies, the ESS is (1,0,0.6), as indicated by black curves (C 3 = 0). When C 3 > C3 * , the government's preference shifts from incentive policies to no action, the ESS evolves into the ideal stable state (1,0,0), as indicated by red curves (C 3 = 3), green curves (C 3 = 6) and blue curves (C 3 = 9). That is, the incentive cost of government plays a positive role to the evolution of the system to the ideal stable state via affecting government conduct. In addition, by comparing Figs. 8 and 9 , we find that the incentive cost has a less impact on the evolution of the system (I) than the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit.
D. EXAMPLE 4: INCENTIVE COST ON THE SYSTEM EVOLUTION
Similarly, in Figs. 9 (a), (b) and (c), we can see that as α value increases, the three sets of curve clusters become more and more tight. This again indicates that the larger α can speed up the system evolution. Figure 10 gives the impact of the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation δ on the dynamic evolution process. As seen in Fig. 10(a) , when δ = 0, the evolutionary result is the mixed strategy (1, 0.07, 0.03), which indicates that the banks are more likely to provide carbon asset pledge credit, but it is unstable (i.e. y ≈ 0.07); when δ = 0.9, the evolutionary result is the mixed strategy (1, 0, 0.03), which implies that the banks are certain to provide carbon asset pledge credit over time, and it is stable (i.e., y = 0); no matter how δ changes, the probability of the grid enterprises choosing low-carbon technology innovation x and the probability of the government choosing incentive policies z are constant over time, the former has remained at 1 and the latter has remained at 0.03. As a result, the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation δ plays a weak positive role only on the strategy choice of the banks, but not the strategies of the government and enterprises.
Similarly, by comparing Figs. 10(a), (b) and (c), it can be found that the larger α is, the tighter the three sets of curve clusters become, the system evolves to an ESS at a faster rate. Figure 11 depicts the impact of the green revenue E 1 on the dynamic evolution process. As shown in Fig. 10(a) , when E 1 = 0, the strategy combination evolves from the initial one (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) to the final one (0.2, 0.5, 0.5); when E 1 = 3, the strategy combination evolves into the mixed strategy (0.3, 0.4, 0.4). As E 1 increases to 6, the strategy combination evolves toward the ideal stable state (1,0,0). As E 1 continues to increase, the evolutionary stable strategy no longer has changed and the evolution rate increases correspondingly. In consequence, the varying green revenues would change the strategies of participants in game, and the higher green revenue avails the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid efficiently via affecting tripartite conducts.
F. EXAMPLE 6: GREEN REVENUE ON THE SYSTEM EVOLUTION
Comparing the terminal positions of the black curves in Figs. 11 (a) and (c), e.g., (0.2, 0.5, 0.5) and (0.9, 0.1, 0.1), we realize that the greater value of α can promote the ESS to evolve to the ideal stable state with other parameters unaltered.
In summary, through the sensitivity analysis of the above six parameters, we find that the introduction of carbon market can still effectively improve the enthusiasm of grid enterprises and banks for the low-carbon technology innovation cooperation, even with phasing out subsidies for electricity industry. And different parameters interfere with the behavior strategies of different subjects, and then affect the evolutionary stable strategies of the three participants. Besides, it can be seen that no matter combining with which parameter, it is the increase of α that significantly promotes the system to evolve to the ideal stable state (1,0,0) at a faster rate by simultaneously affecting the behavior strategies of all subjects.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper establishes a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model to study the evolutionary process of the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation among the grid enterprises, the banks and the government. Three key parameters as decision variables, i.e., the low-carbon technology innovation cost, the extra technology innovation financial cost and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation are introduced into the model. Finally, we discuss the influencing factors of the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) from the perspectives of subsidy, cost and benefit. Based on the simulation results, we provide the following conclusions and recommendations: 1) With the three parameters treated as decision variables, we exclude the two non-Pareto optimal states in the replication dynamic system, and remain the Pareto optimal state (1, 0, 0). That is to say, there exist the optimal values of low-carbon technology innovation cost, technology innovation financial cost and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation that enable the replication dynamic system to spontaneously evolve to the Pareto optimal state. In this case, even little is done by the government, the enterprises are willing to choose low-carbon technology innovation of power grid and the banks are willing to provide carbon asset pledge credit. Therefore, controlling costs and the likelihood of success within a reasonable range, rather than being too high or too low, will benefits the healthy cooperation of low-carbon power grid technology innovation. 2) Low-carbon subsidies have no effect on the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the tripartite evolutionary game in this paper. That is to say, even if the low-carbon subsidies are phased out, carbon asset pledge financing model can indeed effectively improve the enthusiasm of grid enterprises and banks in the cooperation of low-carbon technology innovation. Thence, government can establish a ''government + market'' collaborative incentive mechanism for the low-carbon technology innovation of the power industry, which can not only stimulate the vitality of low-carbon economic development, but also reduce the financial pressure on low-carbon technology innovation of grid enterprises under the new situation of power market reform. 3) From a cost point of view, when the low-carbon technology innovation cost of power grid enterprises is higher, the evolution rate will decrease, but the evolution result of the system will not change, and always be the Pareto optimal state. However, the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost will not only slow down the evolution, but also lead the ESS to deviate from the Pareto optimal state. And the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolutionary process than the incentive cost. Thus, the management for the banks' business cost of carbon asset pledge credit should be particularly concerned, followed by the government incentive cost and the low-carbon technology innovation cost of power grid enterprises. 4) From a benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state. And the effect of the former is greater than the latter. Specifically, the former works by affecting the decision-making of all three participants, the latter works by affecting the decision-making of the banks. Thus, the Chinese government should improve the bargaining position of domestic low-carbon enterprises in the international carbon trading market as soon as possible to stabilize and raise the price of their carbon assets. This would successfully attract more power grid companies to choose low-carbon technological innovation. Demand determines supply. As the number of low-carbon enterprises increases, the more banks are to provide carbon asset pledge credit. 5) The increase of α can promote the system evolves to an ESS at a faster rate. Combined with Figure 2 , we can know that the increase of α means the lower average values of the parameters. Different from the changes of parameters in other conclusions, the reduction of the parameters here is related to the time and the willingness of participation of enterprises and banks. It is a long-term average cost reduction caused by the increase of social productivity. Thus, on the one hand, the government needs to guide more institutions, such as financial institutions and consulting institutions, to provide more comprehensive low-carbon services for grid enterprises; on the other hand, the government must also give more support for low-carbon technology R&D and technology innovation in enterprises to improve factor productivity. This will further promote the low-carbon power grid technology cooperation among heterogeneous entities in long term, and form a virtuous cycle mechanism between technology and economy. This paper introduces the dynamic parameters by treating the three parameters related with the enterprises and banks as decision variables. In fact, the parameters related with government also are influenced by the probability of strategy chosen by participants [32] . Especially under the background of electricity market reform, introducing the dynamic parameter of low-carbon subsidies, we can develop a more realistic game model of the cooperation of low-carbon power grid technology innovation. This model can be used to study the low-carbon development of China's power grid market under the policies of phasing out subsidies, and obtain more accurate simulation results. This is also included in future work. LEI WANG was born in 1986. He received the Ph.D. degree in resource economics and management from the Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, Shandong, China, in 2014. He was a Postdoctoral Fellow of management science and engineering with the Shandong University of Science and Technology, in 2016. He is currently an Associate Professor and teaches with the School of Economics, Ocean University of China. His research interests include corporate finance and corporate governance, regional marine economic low-carbon development, supply chain finance, and decision-making research projects. VOLUME 8, 2020 
